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THE AGNELLO CASE AND THE SEASONABLE
DEMAND RULE
0. H. THORMODSGARD*
The United States Supreme Court in the case of Agnello v.
United States of America 1 has greatly strengthened the rule excluding
evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure, given to us another
test as to what constitutes an unlawful search and seizure, and decided
that the seasonable demand rule does not apply when the facts bearing
out the seizure as being in violation of the Fourth Amendment are not
controverted.
The important facts of this case are as follows: Two Government
agents went to the home of Stephen Alba, where, upon offering to buy
narcotics from Alba and one Centorino, they were requested, and
agreed, to return two days later. When, in accordance with the agree-
ment, the agents returned, Alba's house was watched by six revenue
agents and a city policeman. Alba was seen to leave and return im-
mediately with Centorino, who, upon refusal of the agents to ac-
company him to his home to get the drug that was offered for sale,
stated that he would go and get it. He was then seen by the revenue
agents to leave Alba's home, go first to his own home, and thence to
the home of Frank Agnello, from which he soon emerged and, accom-
panied by Thomas Pace, Thomas Agnello, and Frank Agnello, re-enter
Alba's home. Looking through the window of Alba's house, the revenue
agents saw the illegal sale of cocaine take place; they thereupon, with-
out a warrant, entered and arrested the five defendants.
After the arrest had been made, and while some of the revenue
agents were taking the defendants to the police station, the others went
to and searched Centorino's home and thence to Agnello's home where
they found and seized a can of cocaine.
The five defendants were indicted for violation of the Harrison
Act 2 upon two counts: the first charging the offense of conspiring to
sell heroin and cocaine in violation of the Act, the second charging the
actual sale of heroin and cocaine in violation of the Act. Upon defend-
ant's motion, the second count was dismissed on the ground that it
failed to allege any act or offense within the jurisdiction of the court.3
In the trial it was not asserted that the arrest was unlawful as
having been made without a warrant, because the crime of conspiracy
to sell cocaine contrary to the Harrison Drug Act, which was one of
the counts of the indictment, was committed in the presence of those
who made the arrest.4
*Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
1 46 Supreme Court Reports 4. (1925).
a 38 Statutes at Large 785; and as amended 40 Statutes at Large 1057.
a Indictment alleged "defendant did unlawfully, knowingly, and wil-
fully sell a large quantity of heroin, which is a derivative of opium, and
cocaine which is a derivative of cocoa leaves" without stating where the
sale took place. Transcript of Record p. 8.
'In Ex parte Morrill, 35 Fed. 261 (1888) the court held that the Fourth
Amendment never intended to prevent an arrest by a peace officer for a
crime committeed in his presence. See Kurtz v. Moffit, 115 U. S. 487;
1 Bishop on Crim. Procedure 211.
In Woods v. U. S., 279 Fed. 706 (1922)-a lawful arrest may be ac-
companied by an immediate search of the prisoner, and to take from him
the tools or fruits of his crime.
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When, during the trial; a strong effort was being made by the
Government to establish, through testimony that one of its agents had
searched Agnello's home and seized a can of cocaine, objection was
made on the ground that the search was illegal and that any evidence
so obtained was incompetent. After advising that the objection would
be sustained unless authority could be shown for the entry by the
officers into Agnello's home, the court sustained the objection and ex-
cluded the evidence on the ground that the search and seizure had been
made without a warrant. 5
Without a doubt the inadmissibility of the evidence as part of the
main case was in accordance with the principle of law as decided in
Gouled v. United States.6 "The admission of evidence against the
accused obtained by an illegal search of his premises, and seizure of
his private papers, contravenes the guaranty of the Fifth Amendment
of the United States Constitution against self-incrimination."
Defendant Frank Agnello, a lad of eighteen years, on direct ex-
amination testified that Centorino entered his mother's store where he
was employed, and requested him to take certain packages over to
Alba's house, that Centorino handed him several blue packages, that
he did not know what was in the packages, and that if he had known
he would not have carried them over to Alba's home.
To a question on cross-examination as to whether he had ever seen
narcotics before, he answered in the negative. He further denied hav-
ing ever seen before a certain can of narcotics then shown to him over
objection of the defense. Asked directly whether he had ever seen
the can in his room, he again answered in the negative.'
To rebut this testimony, a Government agent was called, who tes-
tified that in making a search of Agnello's room he found the can of
cocaine on Agnello's wardrobe. The can was then admitted in evidence
over the objection of the defense.8
The United States District Court did not give any reasons why
this evidence was admissible, but it is probable that the Court believed
the evidence offered was related to the facts and to matters stated in
the direct examination by Agnello, and was therefore admissible as
rebuttal evidence, even though it was inadmissible during the main
part of the Government case.
By Writ of Error, the case went up to the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, where only one question was in issue, namely, had there been an
illegal search of Agnello's home and an illegal seizure.
The Circuit Court of Appeals 9 found that the search of Agnello's
room by the Government agents had been based upon personal knowl-
edge that a crime had been committed in their presence, that the arrest
of the defendant had been lawfully made, that a short while prior to
the illegal sale Centorino had been seen to leave Alba's house with the
express object of getting some cocaine, go to his own room, and then
to Agnello's house, from which he and three other defendants had gone
to Alba's house, where the illegal sale took place. The Court therefore
held that "the agents had such direct and personal knowledge and
* Transcript of Record-Agnello v. United States p. 85.
* 255 U. S. 296 (1921).
' Transcript of Record, pp. 476-484.
o Transcript of Record, pp. 485-490.
* 290 Federal 671 (1923).
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such probable cause" as to make the search of Agnello's premises rea-
sonable and justifiable, but observed that if the search and seizure had
not been reasonable it "would have been error under the decisions in
the Gouled and Amos cases" to admit the seized article as evidence
over defendants' objection. Evidently the court decided the case under
the honest belief that the crime of conspiracy took place in Agnello's
room as well as in Alba's house and Within the personal knowledge of
the officers; therefore the subsequent search was but an incident to
the lawful arrest.
The case went to the United States Supreme Court upon a writ of
certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals. There the question was
"whether search of the house of Frank Agnello and seizure of the co-
caine there found, without a warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment
and whether the admission of evidence of such search and seizure
violated the Fifth Amendment."
The Supreme Court held that the search and seizure was un-
reasonable in that the crime of conspiracy ended' when the defendants
were arrested, that since the arrest had taken place at a place other
than Agnello's home, the search of that home had not been an incident
to the lawful arrest but a separate and independent act on the part of
the Government agents.' 0 The mere fact that Government agents had
believed that cocaine would be found in the home of Agnello was not
considered as having given probable cause to search without a warrant,
nor could subsequent finding of drugs there justify the entrance thus
made illegally."2
The Government contention at this time was that even if the
search and seizure were unreasonable, the can of cocaine so obtained
should be admitted as evidence for two reasons: first, because the de-
fendants had failed to move for its return, and second, because grant-
ing the search and seizure to have been unreasonable, the cocaine
should be considered as admissible as rebuttal evidence on cross-exam-
ination, though inadmissible as direct evidence.
To the first contention on the part of the Government, the court
held that inasmuch as the evidence had been obtained by unlawful
search and was consequently not admissible as part of the main case,
the defendant had had no notice that required him to petition for its
return, and therefore, when introduced as rebuttal to evidence secured
on cross-examination, the objection to its admission was not too late,
especially when defendant Agnello disclaimed ever having seen the
evidence and had no knowledge of it.12
This interpretation of the seasonable demand rule is liberal and, it
o Transcript of Record, p. 85. The Government agent searched
Agnello's room about one-half hour after they had seen four of the defend-
ants leave the place.
i A search that is unlawful when it begins is not made lawful when
it ends by the discovery and seizure of property illegally and unlawfully
being used by defendants. See United States v. Kaplan, 266 Fed. 963
(1920); Graske v. U. S., 1 F. (2nd) 620 (1924). Nor can a search war-
rant be issued upon the basis of information first obtained by an illegal
search. U. S. v. Boasberg, 283 Fed. 305 (1922). Cf. Silverthorne Lum-
ber Co. v. U. S., 51 U. S. 385 (1920).
12 Cf. Chicco v. U. S., 284 Fed. 434 (1922); O'Connor v. Potter,/ 276
Fed. 32 (1922). Petitions for the return of property seized in an alleged
unlawful search %ere properly denied, where they contained no allegation
that the property was the property of the petitioners.
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would seem, commendable. In view of the fact that the rule is one of
practice, courts should not technically apply the rule as to defeat
justice.
A consideration of the origin and development of the seasonable
demand rule would here seem desirable. In Adams v. New York L3
the court stated the rule to the effect that in a criminal case evidence
was admissible even though obtained by an illegal search and seizure,
because the court did not wish to pause and determine collateral issues,
as how the evidence was secured. Then in Weeks v. United States 14
the Supreme Court modified this conception and held that the defend-
ant, by a seasonable demand before trial, could require the return of
articles seized as evidence, and that use thereof, after such demand
was in effect compulsory self-incrimination.
Some time later, in the case of Amos v. United States,5 the
Supreme Court held that it was not too late for the defendant to peti-
tion for the return of evidence procured by the Government by an un-
reasonable search, if made immediately after the jury had been sworn.
In Gouled v. United Stateso however, the same court modified the
rule by stating that when the defendant in a criminal case first learns
that his property, unreasonably seized, is offered as evidence, he may
then seasonably move for its exclusion. And in Holmes v. United
States 17 the Court went further to allow an objection made prior to
the final charge to the jury. From these cases it is to be seen that the
application of the seasonable demand rule as a rule of practise will
vary according to the facts and circumstances. Obviously it should
never be used in such a way as to obstruct justice. The limitation of
this rule was noticeable in the Agnello case in that it was held that the
defendant was not required to apply for the return of the property
which he claims he never had or never had seen. 8
To the second contention on the part of the Government, namely,
that the evidence of the search was used only as a medium of dis-
crediting the testimony of Frank Agnello, the court held that Agnello
had not on direct examination testified as to the can of cocaine found
in his room, and that therefore the Government attorney could not be
permitted to cross-examine him on anything unrelated to the direct ex-
amination. Neither had Agnello so testified as to waive his constitu-
tional protection provided under the Fifth Amendment, that "no per-
son shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against him-
self." This holding is in harmony with the case of Poulos v. United
States,19 in which the Government agents had searched defendant's
dwelling house at night, without a search warrant, for narcotics. The
Circuit Court of Appeals, on June 29, 1925, held that the search was
unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution, and that the admission in evidence of the narcotics found
192 U. S. 585 (1903).
14232 U. S. 383 (1913).
15255 U. S. 313 (1920).
is 255 U. S. 298 (1921).
27 275 Fed. 49 (1921).
is Where the illegality of the search appeared from the evidence of
the prosecution, it should be excluded on objection made by the defendant.
Defendant not required to petition for the return of the article seized, but
may motion for its exclusion when it is offered as evidence. Poulos v.
U. S., 8 F. (2nd) 121 (1925).
19 Poulos v. United States, 8 F. (2nd) 121 (1925).
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and seized was in violation of the Fifth Amendment.2 0 The Court
also ruled that where the illegality of the search appeared from the
evidence of the prosecution, the seized articles should be excluded on
objection made by the defendant even though he had not petitioned for
the return of the property seized until it was introduced as evidence.
In the Agnello case the Supreme Court had the opportunity for
the first time to rule that the search of a house without a search war-
rant is contrary to the terms of the Fourth Amendment, unless made
as an incident to a lawful arrest. This judicial conception as to the
inviolability of the home is in harmony with the common law rule.
From the early period of Anglo-American legal history, courts have
given special' protection both to the person and hig dwelling house
against the arbitrary acts of Government officials. In this connection
the first English case is that of Entick v. Carrington,2 1 decided in
1765, in which it was held that the English subject in his home had a
right to protection in his person and in his papers, except in certain
cases, even against the process of law. An American jurist, Judge
Cooley, in his book entitled CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, has Stated:
"The maxim that 'every man's house is his castle' is made a part of
our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting unreasonable search
and seizures and has always been looked upon as of high value to the
citizens." 22
We may profitably ask, What are "persons, homes, papers and
effects" falling within the special protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment? This, adjudicated cases may help us to determine. We should
bear in mind, however, that Congressional legislation has given special
protection to dwelling houses. A recent illustration of such an attitude
is to be seen in the National Prohibition Act,
2 3 which prohibits the
searching of dwelling houses without a search warrant, and which
restricts the issuance of search warrants except when the dwelling
house is being used for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor.
In the leading case of Hester v. United States,24 Government
agents while trespassing on land of defendant's father, saw defendant
come out of his home and deliver a bottle of whiskey to Henderson,
who was in an automobile. When the agents approached, Hester grab-
bed a jug from the car, and both Hester and Henderson ran. In doing
so they discarded the jug and bottle. The Court held that although the
agents were trespassing and had no warrant to search the place, never-
theless the sample liquor could be used as evidence against the defend-
ants without violating the Fourth Amendment, in that the Fourth
Amendment extended only to people in their "persons, houses, papers,
and effects" and not to open fields.
The court in Tritice v. United States s, held that where defendant
stored liquor in an unoccupied barn, the federal officer might search
the place and seize the liquor without a warrant, because it was not the
dwelling house of the defendant. In the case of Schwartz v. United
States,2 6 the court held that in order for the Fourth Amendment to
29 Cf. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1885).
21 19 Howell State Trials 1030.
22 Cooley's Constitutional. Liitations, 7th ed. p. 426.
28 41 Statutes at Large 305, and 42 Statutes at Large 233.
24265 U. S. 57 (1924).
25 4 F. (2nd) 564 (1925).
ze 294 Fed. 528 (1923).
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apply the home searched must be the defendant's home. There a
Government official illegally searched a co-defendant's home without a
warrant. The evidence secured was admissible against the defendant
who did not make his home there, but inadmissible against the party
who did. The court in Jones v. United States 27 held that where of-
ficers entered the defendant's yard without a search warrant and there
discovered some liquor, such evidence had not been obtained by an un-
reasonable search and seizure. It has, however, been held that a cellar
is part of the owner's private dwelling, and may not be searched with-
out a warrant, nor may what is seized in such a search be used as evi-
dence.2 8 A Federal Court has likewise considered a permanent suite
of rooms in a hotel as a private dwelling and therefore entitled to con-
stitutional protection.-o This was in accordance to Section 25 of the
National Prohibition Act which defines private dwellings.3 0
Courts are liberal in their interpretation of what a dwelling house
is. In the case of Guisli v. United States- the defendant operated a
grocery store, in the rear of which he had his home. A search warrant
for the search of the premises described as a grocery store was held
not to auth9rize the search of the living quarters; hence the liquor
seized in the living quarters was not admissible as evidence, for it had
been secured by an unreasonable search and seizure.
In reference to private garages, we have two illustrative cases. In
Temperance v. United States32 while the defendant was absent,
officers entered a garage which was underneath his house. The
search was held to be unreasonable. But where the defendant leased
his garage, which was in the basement of his house, to third parties,
then it was not considered part of the dwelling house of the defend-
ant and might be searched without a warrant.33 Evidently the court will
consider whether the garage, barn, cellar, etc., are being used by the
defendants or being used by some one else, in order to determine
whether they are or are not part of the dwelling house.
Some of the decisions of those states which interpret their own
search and seizure clause according to the so-called Federal theory are
instructive as to the meaning of the phrase "dwelling house." 3 4 In
Oklahoma, the case of Findley v. State35 held that the seizure of
a still in a canyon not adjacent to any human habitation* was not un-
reasonable, even though done without a search warrant. It was not
2z7 296 Fed. 632 (1924).
29 Keepe v. Clark, 287 Fed. 372 (1923).
20 U. S. v. Sievers, 292 Fed. 394 (1923).
so "The term 'private dwelling' shall be construed to include the room
or rooms used and occupied not transiently but solely as a residence in an
apartment house, hotel, or boarding house."
s24 F. (2d) 703 (1925).
32 299 Fed. 365 (1924).
as Earl v. United States, 4 F. (2d) 532 (1925).
a4 Fifteen States adhere to the federal rule. Cf. People v. Castree,
311 Ill. 392 (1924); Batts v. State, 194 Ind. 609 (1924); People v. Max-
hausen, 204 Mich. 559 (1919); Owens v. State, 133 Miss. 75a (1923); State
v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348 (1924); State ex iel Thebodeau v. District Court, 72
Mont. 619 (1924); Foster v. State (Okla.), 226 Pac. 602 (1924); State v.
Laundy, 103 Ore. 443 (1922); Hughes v. State, 145 Tenn. 544 (1921); State
v. Slamon, 73 Vt. 212 (1900); State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171 (1922); Novak
v. State, 185 Wis. 616 (1925); State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185 (1920).
35 234 Pac. 227 (1925).
Cf. Reutlinge v. State, 234 Pac. 224 (1925.
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part of defendant's dwelling house. In Missouri, the search of de-
fendant's woodland under a void search warrant leading to discovery
of liquor was .held not to be a violation of rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures as guaranteed by the State Constitution.36 But
a search and seizure of liquor by officers in defendant's dwelling
house, without a warrant, was considered as having violated the State
constitutional provisions.
3 7
However, in Kentucky, in the case of Morse v. Commonwealth,38
the defendant had a dugout one-fourth of a mile from. his farm
houses. This dugout was composed of three dirt walls and an arti-
ficial one made by defendant. It was provided with a place of entry
and exit. The defendant had a still in this dugout. Without a war-
rant, the State agents searched it. The court held that this dugout
was part of his dwelling houses, and was entitled to the constitutional
privileges relating to searches and seizures.
From these few Federal and State cases one can realize that the
Courts who apply the Federal rule go to great lengths to protect the
"person, houses, papers, and effects" from arbitrary search on the
part of overzealous government officials. As Judge Hutchinson said
in United States v. Rembert,39 "As to private residences, no search
can ever be justified under the federal law without a search warrant,
except as an incident to a lawful arrest therein."40
Congress, by legislation, has often distinguished between the neces-
sity for revenue officers to have warrant in searching private dwell-
ings and the right to search vehicles and vessels without a warrant in
order to enforce the revenue acts. 41 When the National Prohibition
Act was amended in 1921, Congress followed precedent in making it
a misdemeanor for any officer of the United States, in enforcing the
Act, to search any dwelling house without a warrant, or to search any
other property without probable cause. The so-called Standley
Amendment proposed at this time was rejected by the House, because
by its terms it prohibited the search of any property or premises with-
out a warrant. Such a restriction would in effect have prevented
the enforcement of the Act, because it made no distinction between
searching movable vehicles and vessels, and searching buildings. And
as a matter of common knowledge, we are aware that many violations
of the Prohibition Act are carried on by means of automobiles.
When the case of Carroll v. United States4 2 was considered by
the Supreme Court, it was reasonable for the court to decide that the
search, without a warrant, of an automobile engaged in the illegal
transportation of intoxicating liquor, upon probable cause, was not
contrary to the terms of the Fourth Amendment.
30 State v. Zugrass, 267 S. W. 804 (Mo. 1924).
37 State v. Smith, 267 S. W. 65 (1924).
as 265 S. W. 37 (1924).
so 284 Fed. 996 (1922).
,o Peru v. U. S., 4 F. (2d) 881 (1925). Search of a dwelling house
in rear of fruit store without warrant, or information furnished by gov-
ernment witness, who purchased liquor therein and seizing of whiskey
therein, were unreasonable under Constitutional Amendment 4, and evid-
ence so secured was inadmissible.
41 Cf. 1 Statutes at Large 29, Sec. 24; 1 Statutes at Large 145, Sec. 47;
1 Statutes at Large 627, Sec. 68; 3 Statutes at Large 231; 13 Statutes at
Large 231; 13 Statutes at Large 441.
42 45 Supreme Court Rep. 280, 267 U; S. 132 (1924).
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It is not reasonable to presume that the same degree of inviolable
privacy belongs to an automobile transporting intoxicating liquor as
to a person's dwelling house and private papers. An automobile
being used for the transportation of intoxicating liquor becomes the
instrument by which a crime is committeed, and, according to Section
26 of the National Prohibition Act, under such facts, both the auto-
mobile and liquor are subject to seizure and forfeiture. Goods that
are subject to seizure and forfeiture are not given the same protection
as other property. This is expressed very clearly in Boyd v. United
States 43 when the court said: "The search for and seizure of stolen
or forfeited goods or goods liable for duties and concealed to avoid
the payment thereof, are totally different things from a search for and
seizure of a man's private books and papers for the purpose of obtain-
ing information contained, or of using them as evidence against him.
In the one case, the government is entitled to the possession of the
property; in the other it is not."
The Carroll case then represents that it is reasonable to search
an automobile when done without malice and with probable cause.
We may now ask the question, What is probable cause?
In the Carroll case, probable cause consisted of the fact that the
Government agents knew that some two months prior, the defendants
had attempted to sell them some liquor, that at the time of the seizure
the defendants Were driving the same car as when they attempted to
negotiate a sale with them, that the defendants were on a highway
coming from a city which was noted for having a large supply of
contraband liquor, and were on their way to their home town where
they had previously attempted to sell intoxicating liquor. Acting
upon reasonable belief that the defendants were transporting liquor,
the Government agents halted and searched the car on the highway.
A majority of the court held that all of these facts constituted prob-
able cause, even though the search and seizure preceded a lawful
arrest.4
4
What constitutes probable cause cannot accurately be defined, but
depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.4 5
Probable cause in Milam v. United States46 consisted in the fact that
the Government agents had been informed that a truck load of whiskey
would make use of a certain road, and had been stationed on the high-
way, where they intercepted defendant's truck. In searching, "bootleg
Chinamen" were found instead of whiskey. The Court in the case
held that the search had been based upon reasonable belief that liquor
was being illegally transported and that the search therefore was legal.
43 116 U. S. 616 (1885).
44 "The Courts, are, therefore, under the duty of deciding what is an
unreasonable search of motor cars in the light of the mandate of the
Constitution that intoxicating liquors shall not be manufactured, sold, or
transported for beverages purposes. * * To hold that such motor cars
must never be stopped or searched without a search warrant would be a
long step by the Courts in aid of the traffic outlawed by the Constitution."
Milam v. U. S., 296 Fed. 629, 631 (1924).
45 "Not only are the several expressions in the Constitution vague, but
what is "unreasonable" or what is "probable cause" may vary in meaning
at successive periods just as "due process" has been given different mean-
ing at different times." 25 Mich. L. R. 281.
4a 296 Fed. 629 (1924).
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In Ash v. United States,4 7 probable cause existed when the Govern-
ment agents, knowing that defendant was to bring in a load of liquor
to town, stationed themselves on the highway near the railway tracks.
About midnight the road way was blocked by a freight train. See-
ing several cars waiting to cross the track, including the defendant's,
the officers boarded the defendant's car and searched it. The search
and seizure was held to be reasonable, even though it preceded a law-
ful arrest. In Ungerleider v. United States,4 8 the officer had been
informed that a Nash car, bearing a certain number, was engaged in
delivering liquor. Later, when the officer saw a Nash car with that
number, he boarded it and searched and found liquor. It was held
that the officer had probable cause for searching the car. From the
many adjudicated cases, the most we can say is that probable cause is
not actual and personal knowledge, but may be a fair inference from
other known facts.4 9
It is a worthy distinction that if officers believe contraband drugs
and liquors are being sold in a dwelling house, they should secure a
search warrant before they invade the premises. Yet with reference
to a moving ship, wagon, or automobile, transporting contraband drugs
and liquors, such precautionary measures cannot be taken, because be-
fore the search warrant could be secured, the moving object would be
beyond reach. Consequently Congress and the Federal courts only
require reasonable cause before a search may be made of such vehicles.
The Agnello and Carroll cases were decided on reasonable grounds.
It is submitted that such decisions will neither hamper nor retard
Government attempts to curb crime, nor minimize the rights of the
public to have property and person secured from unreasonable inter-
ference on the part of government officials.
The rights under the Fourth Amendment are not self executed.
Some means must be adopted by the courts to see that these rights are
not interfered with by the executive or legislative departments of our
government. Common practise permits the party whose rights under
the Fourth Amendment have been interfered with a civil action against
the officer who made the unreasonable search. 50 For many reasons
this is found unsatisfactory. The person convicted on the evidence
secured by an unreasonable search in practise would be unable to
secure any damages. Often the innocent victim hesitates to bring
an action against an officer acting under orders. Likewise a large
percentage of the judgments so secured would be valueless in that
many of the officers are not solvent.
A criminal action against the officer making an illegal seizure is a
poor remedy largely because the officer is instructed by his superiors or
by the prosecuting attorney to make the illegal search. A Government
attorney cannot be expected to prosecute effectively the man who has
aided him in securing convictions. Moreover, the subjection of the
officer to a fine or punishment would often act as a deterrent to the
performance of duties. Then too, it would seem unsocial for the
47299 Fed. 277 (1924).
4s 5 F. (2d) 604 (1925).
49 Allshuler v. U. S., 3 F. (2d) 379 (1925); Reff v. U. S. 2F (2d) 40
(1924); Nicholson v. U. S., 6 F. (2d) 569 (1925); Green v. U. S., 289 Fed.
236 (1923); U. S. v. Snyder, 278 Fed. 650 (1922).
5o24 R. C. L. 725; McClurg v. Brinton, 23 Iowa 368 (1904); Sheptall
v. Zipperer, 133 Ga. 488 (1909).
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Government to bring about convictions on evidence secured by agents
in disregard of constitutional rights. As Chief Justice Carroll in
Youeman v. CommonwealthSl said: "Will Court, established to admin-
ister justice and enforce the laws of the State, receive, over the objec-
tion of the accused, evidence offered by the prosecution that was
admittedly obtained by a public officer in deliberate disregard of law
for the purpose of securing the conviction of an alleged offender. It
seems to us that a practice like this would do infinitely more harm
than good in the administration of justice; that it would surely create
in the minds of the people the belief that Courts had no respect for
the Constitution or laws, when respect interfered with the ends desired
to be accomplished. In the exercise of their great powers, Courts
have no higher duty to perform than those involving the protection
of the citizen in the civil rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution."
To permit evidence secured by an illegal seizure to be admitted in trial
would be to give to the prosecuting attorney and Federal officers a
premium to ignore constitutional rights of individuals.
For these reasons the Federal courts have adopted a practical
rule to give effect to the Fourth Amendment by excluding evidence
secured by an unreasonable seizure when proper objection to its intro-
duction as evidence is made by the party whose rights have been in-
fringed.52 In fact, the only workable way to prevent violation of con-
stitutional rights of a person is for the courts to refuse to countenance
unreasonable searches and seizures by excluding the evidence so
obtained.
51189 Ky. 162 (1920).
s2 Cf. 20 Ill. L. R. 77, 78; Chafee's, 37 H. L. R. 513, 517.
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